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The purpose of this paper is to provide analysis of the capabilities and the
overall path that European Union Forces (EUFOR) have undertaken ill Bosnia
and Herzegovina (BiH). To do so we will look at the goals of EUFOR, its
composition, its funding and actions during the past period. Using those fill dings
we will then be able to assess whether or not EUFOR is on a path to success
or failure and finally determine if it is in Croatia s interest to take part
in the EU's crisis mission in BiH.
Key words:
1. Introduction
En route to negotiations between Yugoslavia
and its soon-to-break-away constituent Slovenia, in
May 1991, Luxembourg's Foreign Minister and
momentary President ofthe Council ofEU, Jacques
Poos, with a profound sense of European identity
and power, prophetically stated "The hour of Europe
has dawned": For him, and many other European
politicians, the impending implosion of Yugoslavia
was going to be the opportunity to show the world
that the EU was a verified global player, capable of
not only taking care of the Balkans in a solidified,
coherent and strategic European approach but also
one in no way led by the USA, as Jacques De1ors,
President of the European Commission in 1991, put
it - "We do not interfere ill American affairs, so we
hope they will have enough respect not to interfere
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in ours."? In the very beginning these statements even
made some sense because the war in Slovenia suc-
cessfully ended through negotiations in very short
period of time, but the real problems were just be-
ginning however, and to this day, it is hard to fathom
how catastrophically short these same words would
fall in a few short months.
Acting through the UN authorized peace-keep-
ing mission that resembled swimming with bound
hand and feet, European nations along with the rest
of the world sat back and watched as one Bosnian
Serb aggression after another, followed by Croat and
Bosniak counterattack after counterattack, led to over
.200 000 killed with approximately two million dis-
placed persons in the region. In the end, it took three
years of killings for the UN and the EU to act, but
this time under the auspices of NATO, and under the
plan and will of the USA. Although no international
ground troops were committed to stop the Serb ag-
gression, continuous bombing of their positions along
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with the offensive of the Croatian army, brought the
leaders from Belgrade, Sarajevo and Zagreb to the
negotiations table in Dayton (Ohio). Once again,
under the decisive leadership and flexibility of the
US negotiations team, the Dayton Peace Agreement
was argued, agreed upon and initiated. Meanwhile,
the most substantial EU contribution during the
Dayton peace process was insisting that the official
signing of the peace treaty should be done in Paris -
an act to save face, rather than to end the war.
NATO would remain in BiH for the next nine
years', this time using both ground forces as well as
its air superiority, to make sure each entity in Bosnia
implemented the provisions of the Dayton Peace
Accord - the de-escalation, demilitarization and dis-
armament of their armed forces and civilian popula-
tion as well as the repatriation of the displaced per-
sons, whether they were Croats, Bosniaks or Serbs.
NATO's first task force, named the Implementation
Force (lFOR), was charged with the task aforemen-
tioned and became operational on 20 December 1995
with over sixty thousand American, European and
Russian troops. Nevertheless, IFOR's Operation
Joint Endeavour was heavily restricted in its actions.
Stringent parameters and rules of engagements prac-
tically eliminated the adjective portion from the
phrase decisive action.
"At one point, during the first year of Joint
Endeavour, Bosnian Serb politicians and national-
ists encouraged those Bosnian Serbs living in
Sarajevo and other parts of the BiH Federation held
territories to destroy their property and relocate to
Republika Srpska. Hundreds of homes were subse-
quently set ablaze, often destroying entire apartment
complexes rather than just the individual home, and
when some Serbs wanted to stay, nationalists thugs
would do the work for them, forcing people to leave.
Throughout it all however, IFOR was not able to ar-
rest any individual unless its own forces were di-
rectly endangered, and through other similar loop
holes, implementation of Dayton was to take much
longer than a year.?'
The subsequent task force, known as the
Stabilisation Force (SFOR), took over where IFOR
left off and began Operation Joint Guardian/Opera-
tion Joint Forge on 20 December 1996.5
At the Istanbul Summit on 28 June 2004, NATO ex-
pressed its intention to pull out ofBiH by the begin-
ning of December. 6 Over those eight years of its op-
eration, SFOR's mission was, like IFOR's, summed
up in the provisions of the General Framework
Agreement, working towards a stable, secure and
independent BiH. SFOR's actions must surely be
applauded for keeping the peace for an additional
eight years, however, a report filed by the Interna-
tional Commission on the Balkans just five months
after SFOR left BiH, emphasized the reality of the
precarious situation Bosnia still found itself in, stat-
ing:
"The region is as close to failure as it is to
success. For the moment, the wars are over but the
smell of violence still hangs heavy in the air. The
region's profile is bleak - a mixture of weak states
and international protectorates, where Europe has
stationed almost half of its deployable forces. Eco-
nomic growth in these territories is low or non-ex-
istent; unemployment is high; corruption is perva-
sive; and the public is pessimistic and distrustful to-
wards its nascent democratic institutions."?
Fixing the remaining, and increasingly com-
plicated political, economic and military problems
(i.e., integrating the entities' militaries and police
forces under national ministries, curbing corruption,
fighting widespread unemployment, and attracting
foreign investment) would once again fall onto the
willing shoulders of the EU, bringing the historically
painful words of Jacques Poos and Jacques Delors
to the forefront once again.
The European book entitled "Taking care of
our own affairs" was once again opened and added
to on 21 June 2003. Addressing all EU Member states
and nations from the region, Romano Prodi" irrevo-
cably declared at the Thessaloniki Summit that Eu-
rope's unification will not be complete until the coun-
tries from the region are members of the Union, and
added that the EC is ready to pull out all stops to
implement this agenda."
Two United Nations Security Council Reso-
lutions (UNSCR) cemented this declaration before
the world s most global body: on 9 July 2004 UNSCR
1551 welcomed the EU's intention to launch its mis-
sion in BiH, and on 22 November 2004 UNSCR 1575
authorised the EU mission to proceed and in par-
ticular its military component, EUFOR, to proceed
that December. With the arrival of EUFOR on 2
December 2004, the EU has for the most part as-
sumed complete authority and responsibility for BiH.
The plan was for the military component, EUFOR,
to work in conjunction with Office of High Repre-
sentative (OHR), the EU Monitoring Mission
(EUMM), the EU Military Committee (EUMC), the
EU's Political and Security Committee (PSC) and
the EU Police Mission (EUPM) in an interoperative
capacity not possible during past UN and NATO-led
missions. The EU took Jacques Poos words to a com-
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pletely new level, this time truly internalising the
problems in the country and in a certain sense in the
region. Though that was the plan, the question we
have yet to answer is "How does. and how success-
fully has. EUFOR contributed to the stabilising of
the BiH?"
2. The Mission
The most important thing to recognize about
the objectives of EUFOR is that they originate and
concentrate on political goals. Its guiding framework
is based on the General Framework Agreement for
Peace (GFAP) - Annexes I-A and 2, the 2003 Feasi-
bility Study conducted by an appointed EU commis-
sion, and OHR's annual Mission Implementation
Plan. Not only are EUFOR's operations organised
in regard to these documents and in promoting OHR's
intent, but its exit strategy is based on building effi-
cient state level structures and on whether or not BiH
"is a stable, viable, peaceful and
multiethnic ... irreversibly on track towards EU mem-
bership"!" EUFOR's mission in BiH is thus divided
into three groupings - short-term, medium-term and
long-term political objectives.
In the short term, EUFOR's first and poten-
tially most disastrous challenge was to ensure that it
did not permit BiH's security to slip simply because
of the transition scheduled on 2 December 2004. Its
second task was to make sure that the Stabilisation
and Association Process and the Mission Implemen-
tation Plan reinforce each other. In the medium term,
EUFOR's goals were to turn over more and more
ownership of peace implementation to BiH authori-
ties while at the same time contributing to a secure
situation within the country, to allow political and
economic reforms to take place. Finally, the long term
objective is the condition aforementioned - ... irre-
versibly on the track ... that determines the end of state
mission for EUFOR.
The key military tasks associated with accom-
plishing these tasks are:
* Providing a robust presence to deter lingering
militant extremists, to monitor the population and
entity armed forces, and therefore to prevent a re-
sumption of violence;
* Ensuring security and freedom of movement
for all political and economic EU actors;
* Conducting information operations for politi-
cal objectives;
* Managing lingering aspects of the GFAP, in-
cluding airspace management, advice on de-mining
and ordnance disposal and weapon collection pro-
grammes."
The key supporting tasks also illustrate the im-
portance of the political mandate since these tasks
further illustrate that EUFOR is simply another tool
at the disposal of international and domestic organi-
sations within the BiH. The four key supporting tasks
were:
* Supporting civil crisis teams regarding coun-
ter-terrorism, the fight against organised crime and
strengthening the rule of law;
* Assisting BiH authorities with technical and
military advice specifically in defence reform and
other areas of security;
* Supporting the ICTY and BiH authorities to
look for and detain the indicted;
* In an unforeseen case of dire circumstances,
evacuating IC officials in BiH.12
Thus, while the EUFOR does have clear mili-
tary tasks, it is geared toward subjective political and
social goals rather than to the more tangible goals of
eliminating the enemy. The enemy in this case is
general corruption, criminal activity, ethnic animos-
ity, as well as economic and institutional weakness
and political discord, and as a result EUFOR is a
part of a highly complicated, politically sensitive
mission which requires completely different things
from its troops than their traditional basic training
of point and shoot. Multinational Task Force North-
west commander, Brigadier Ian Liles puts it the best:
"In conducting these tasks, anti smuggling
operations among others, and other aspects of the
EUFOR mission we are breaking new ground in the
use of military forces. This has involved EUFOR
soldiers having to adapt and develop new skills, and
learn about the subjects as unfamiliar as the logging
industry and the fuel trade. Although this does not
draw to our traditional war fighting skills it is no
less important because if we get this final effort right
we can help ensure BiH reaches its potential. .. "13
ALTHEA surely promotes, and requires, that
thirty three member nations work together to not only
break the language barrier associated with such a
multinational operation, but also to get every dispa-
rate unit on the same page in terms of training and
skill sets.
However, it is important to note that despite
the significant challenges facing EUFOR during its
mission in BiH, the situation it finds itself in is of a
fundamentally different character than that of other
forces currently active in the world today, such as
the USA, and even NATO, in its mission in Iraq and
Afghanistan. Operation ALTHEA therefore can not
be regarded as a trial by fire as much as it can be
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regarded as a trial run on attempted union of politi-
cal wills through one common badge.
For the first time, a complete, single-entity
mission was established in a country. Never before
has the OHR, now dual-hatted as the EUSR, had as
much of a role and influence of troops to satisfy his
Mission Implementation Plan and bring Bosnia and
Herzegovina back on to its own two feet.
Unlike a mission run by NATO or that of the
US alone, Operation ALTHEA is part of a new ap-
proach to crisis management." First, NATO is a se-
curity organization that is not properly designed for
a complete economic and political operation while
it has proved exceptionally decisive in its military
capacity. The reasons for these are numerous but one
easily identifiable is that in NATO there are many
more organizations than that of the EU, as well as
many more 'alpha nations' determined to affect the
economy or political situation on the ground. Sec-
ond, no one nation alone will be respected for or
even morally allowed to conduct peace-keeping, cri-
sis-management operations in another. An example
is that of the US and its coalition in Operation Iraqi
Freedom, which is seen as a product of American
greed. The EU serves in the unique position of be-
ing able to coalesce strong, recognizably independ-
ent, nations (not just states in the case of the US) to
bring all three pillars of economic, political, and now
military force to bear on any nation. EUFOR is the
last of these pillars and is the largest attempt by the
EU thus far to unite behind a single foreign, security
policy (ESOP) and to attempt to fill in tile shoes of a
big, battle-proven force, NATO.
3. Composition - Fact and Figures
Although one can argue that technical details
about composition of forces and their organisation
perhaps would not be appropriate in this kind of ar-
ticle, or somebody may find the following too de-
scriptive, in order to show the complexity of the
EUFOR's mechanism it is decided to put those in-
formation into the text.
EUFOR has drawn the support and commit-
ment of troops from 33 nations to accomplish its
mission in BiH, and its total troop strength is 6688,
made up of 5802 soldiers from 22 EU nations and
886 troops from 11 non-EU nations. 15
EUFOR is divided into four task forces which
are the Integrated Police Unit (IPU), the Multina-
tional Task Force North-West (MNTF-NW), the
Multinational Task Force North (MNTF - N), and
the Multinational Task Force South East (MNTF -
SE). BiH is divided into three military areas of op-
eration that are controlled by the mentioned MNTFs.
EUFOR's day to day operation in BiH are run by its
Commander, but higher up the chain of command is
the EU Operation Commander for ALTHEA, also
dual-hatted as NATO's Deputy Supreme Allied Com-
mander for Europe (D-SACEUR). The Political and
Security Committee follows next and provides the
political control and strategic direction for EUFOR.16
Ultimately however, EUFOR is placed under the
authority of the Council of the EU.
IPU, whose primary mission is to support the
OHR's Mission Implementation Plan and EUFOR's
relevant key supporting tasks, numbers 534 soldiers
and consists of a Headquarters, a Mobile Element of
four company size units responsible for carrying out
Normal Framework Operations, civil disturbance
operations and quick reactions force operations; a
Specialised Element of five investigations teams and
one operational support team and a Logistic Element
consisting of units for logic supply and maintenance.
MNTF - NW is comprised of three EU na-
tions (UK, Netherlands and Austria) and seven non-
member states (Canada, Chile, New Zealand, Ro-
mania, Bulgaria, Norway and Switzerland). The com-
bined troop strength is approximately 1600 and it
includes a Signals Unit, a Medical Unit, an Aviation
Unit and a Multinational Battle Group of two ma-
noeuvre and one security company (comprised by
the UK and the Netherlands). There are also 16 Li-
aison and Observation Teams (LOTs) that live and
work in the local communities.
MNTF - N is comprised of 11 EU nations
(Austria, Belgium, Czech Republic, Finland, Greece,
Ireland, Latvia, Poland, Portugal, Slovenia and Swe-
den) and I non-member state (Turkey). The Task
Force contains over 1800 troops, most with experi-
ence in peace supporting operations, and it also in-
cludes a Signal, a Security, an Aviation, a Compos-
ite, and a Reconnaissance Company as well as a
Military Police Platoon, a Multinational Integrated
Logistic Unit and a Manoeuvre Battalion. There are
also 14 LOTs dispersed in the local communities.
MNTF - SE is comprised of 4 EU nations
(France, Germany, Italy and Spain) and 2 non-Mem-
ber states (Albania and Morocco). It contains over
1500 troops and includes a Support Unit, a Commu-
nication and Information Unit, an Intelligence Sur-
veillance and Reconnaissance Unit, a Verification
Unit and a Liaison and Observation Unit. There are
also 16 LOTs situated in the local communities.
LOTs are one of many ways in which EUFOR
is making its presence felt throughout BiH using a
___ lJ
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Complexity shown in the last few paragraphs
leads us to the conclusions about the high costs of
this mission and hence also to a rational need for
detailed evaluation of the funding system used for
it. Financing has always been traditionally compli-
cated within the EU. Basing its foreign policy on
Three Pillars which divide up all areas of possible
operations into the community dimension (economic
and monetary affairs), the security dimension (the
Common Security and Foreign Policy) and the judi-
cial and home affairs dimension (Justice and Home
Affairs), each Pillar has its own budgeting process
and resources. The Amsterdam Treaty of the Euro-
pean Union provided much autonomy to its member
states, stating that all EU military operations would
not be funded trough regular EU budget, but by a
percentage of the GNP from the states that partici-
pate in each mission (allowing EU member states
more control over whether or not they choose to take
part). Then in 2002, another distinction was made
between common and individual costs to the Mem-
ber states "where only the former would be funded
through GNP-based scales, while individual costs
would be funded by the principle of costs lie where
they fall". J7 This provided a much looser structure
for obtaining funds for countries, but these propos-
als and treaties did not address the issue of financ-
ing EU operations having military or defence impli-
cations.
Thus, on 23 February 2004, the ATHENA
mechanism was established for all future EU opera-
tions involving military force by EU Council Deci-
sion 20041197/CFSP18. Operation ALTHEA is
funded by this mechanism, which continues to pre-
serve that dichotomy of common and individual
costs." The largest individual cost for each member
state is funding their individual troops with salaries
and housing, as this is not covered by the common
budget. Arguably, the most important section of this
document rests in the Article 23 - Determination of * EUFOR is going to be and already is an inte-
Contributions in Chapter 7, which addresses the gral part of the EU's growth and consolidation as a
funds that each member state must provide. Lastly, potential global player with recognisable influence
there has been large reform in the funding process in the region (after the September 11, the US focus
which removes the requirement for a separate Coun- turned to combat against terrorism and this mission
limited number of troops. They are on average made
up often to twelve soldiers who integrate themselves
with the local authorities, supervising local opera-
tions, observing the civilian population and remain-
ing visual for the sudden emergence of conflict,
whether ethnic, political or military and for these
reasons LOTs are labelled the eyes and ears of
EUFOR.
4. Funding
cil Decision for the financing of each operations,
giving ATHENA the decision-making authority for
determining operational common costs, which "can
be seen as an attempt to satisfy some of the need for
centralised administration of the financing mecha-
nism for EU-Ied military operations, which is still a
sensitive issue within the EU."20
While ATHENA is a much more efficient
funding mechanism, there are still significant prob-
lems associated with other budgetary programs that
are also quite integral to the success of ALTHEA's
overall mission. There is a lack of procedures for
the quick release of funds, and prolonged planning
and mission start-up could deny EU's rapid reaction
capabilities in future crises. The common costs that
have been covered by the Community budget have
been changed in variety from one operation to the
next, including once more for the EU Police Mis-
sion that started on 1 January 2003. If this is not
fixed, when the EU is attacked or needs to respond
quickly, there will not be a mechanism or structure
already in place to handle that threat, and then it
might be too late for the appropriate reactions to be
taken. EUFOR had several years, from the time of
its declaration of intent to its arrival, to prepare prop-
erly for its operations in Bosnia-Herzegovina. There
is still no way that the EU could handle a situation
like the one of Iraq or Afghanistan if it was thrown
on them.
5. Potential Croatia's Role
in ALTHEA Operation
Croatia currently supports EUFOR's operation
ALTHEA in addition to NATO's continued presence
as the most important and effective international ef-
forts regarding the BiH's future. Regarding AL-
THEA, Croatia has been providing an extensive, vi-
tal logistical support to all of its operations that in-
volve air-see-land transit or support bases. Even
though Croatia has not been asked to contribute
troops to ALTHEA, it has been providing it with free
air control services, as well as for the KFOR Opera-
tion in Kosovo. Additionally, Croatia has been pro-
viding EUFOR with medical support as well.
There is a very rational argument for Croatia
taking part in the EUFOR more actively, because of
the at least few visible reasons:
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should, to a certain extent, be a proof of the EU's
capabilities in that sense);
* Croatia has clear intention to join the EU, for
its own security and welfare;
* Croatia can currently be both a potential can-
didate for NATO and an EUFOR participant;
* EUFOR does not involve in domestically un-
favourable, casualty producing missions but in 'moral
acts' that can bring about as much positive change if
not more than troops sent to depose dictators.
There is much to gain and little to lose from
Croatia being involved more or even fully joining
the EUFOR, although several considerations need
to be kept in mind:
First, while operation ALTHEA is on course
to accomplishing its mission, there is no informa-
tion how long it will have to stay in BiH - until the
country is 'viable and self-sustaining' - without any
clear date for ending an increasingly limitless op-
eration of 'security and state building', each mem-
ber state has to be prepared for the extension of the
mandate of the forces in BiH. EUFOR will have to
remain in BiH at least until the Kosovar and
Montenegrin issues of sovereignty are finally ad-
dressed. Even a mild conflict over territory in this
region could shake the fragile state that BiH is cur-
rently in. There is a considerable amount of work
that yet needs to be done to satisfy the 2003 Feasi-
bility Report (particularly in regard to the Police re-
form and the collaboration with ICTY). Also another
new administration should adjust (the new High
Representative took the office on I February 2006).
All this could significantly increase tensions within
Bosnia and Herzegovina's political circles and
EUFOR's presence will again be needed as a safety
for worse case scenarios.
Second, EUFOR to date has not been militarily
or administratively tested. As for the foreseeable
future in BiH, there will be no real way to sense how
EUFOR commanders would respond in the heat of
the battle, to test the overall troop cohesion (despite
simulated exercises) or to see how forcefully EU
politicians would stick to their convictions and per-
sist in BiH in face of certain troop deaths. There has
been no invasion to thwart or attacks to repeal. Sol-
diers move around freely and at ease, as it is evident
in the design and tasks implementation of LOT. IFOR
and SFOR, under the auspices of NATO, took the
brunt of the problems - during the nine years they
were responsible for the overall security and stabil-
ity in BiH (there were around 260 deaths and inju-
ries just in IFOR operations). Also, despite the fact
that the EUFOR presents a multinational collabora-
tion, with 33 nations taking part, one of the simplest
issues -language - could derail the situation during
an actual peacekeeping or offensive mission. Sim-
ply put, when those bullets start flying, what lan-
guage is going to be used for troop s coordination
against an enemy? Or maybe furthermore, troops
should be t1uent, or at least conversant, in many lan-
guages and, due to time and energy constraints; there
will have to be guidance from the EU Council over
what language will take precedence, if any.
Third, BiH public and a part of political elites
will most likely not favour Croatian troops in the
country, even if under the auspices of EUFOR, due
to different interpretations of the use of Croatian
military forces in that country in the last decade.
However, there is a sufficient reason for Croatia to
try and involve its troops in logistics operations, al-
lowing to publicly claim full participation in EUFOR,
and not only the support for this mission. Also, by
sending troops into EUFOR, Croatia would work on
building trust between itself and other member states.
Finally, concerning this topic, it would be advisable
for Croatia to consider in what capacity it could help
EUFOR to accomplish its mission. Obviously, lan-
guage skills are a significant plus for Croatian stuff
involved and should be offered and used." An addi-
tional problem could be the placement of Croatian
troops as it is hard to imagine them residing in FBiH
let alone the RS. At the very least, it would still be
advisable for Croatia to begin negotiations with the
EU and parallel with the state administration in BiH
to work out arrangement for additional Croatian help
even ifit is not in the form suggested here. IfEUFOR
remains a force, as all facts point to the affirmative,
then it will only be a matter of time before Croatia
also plays a part in its scope.
Fourth, there will be economic and political
costs for support of Croatian troops in BiH or in any
other country the troops would be sent. Croatia
should be willing to fund a certain portion of the
common costs as well. Time would also have to be
spent on negotiations with BiH, the OHR, command-
ers of EUFOR and diplomats of the Council of Eu-
rope in order to gain their confidence for joining the
mission.
6. Conclusion
Ultimately, the greatest benefit to Croatia for
joining the EUFOR would be the international rec-
ognition of its credibility regarding military, eco-
nomic and political development, especially if its
troops prove that they can act professionally in such
-_-.--_L
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a demanding environment, taking into consideration
recent conflicts in the region, particularly BiH, as
well as different interpretations of the role of Croatian
army in that sense. Indeed, Croatia is the only coun-
try among the group of four lobbing for accession to
the EU (Bulgaria, Romania, Turkey and Croatia) that
is not a part of the EUFOR. Croatian engagement, in
this way, will demonstrate a very high level of matu-
rity and professionalism in its armed forces, and
transparent civil control of them. Furthermore,
Croatian troops will get to drill and work in con-
junction with other EU nations, who represent not
only EUFOR but also NATO. This works towards
the long-term goal of Croatia to additionally promote
its accession to the EU and NATO. There is no rea-
son why Croatia should not offer EUFOR its skills
with linguistics, among all, and playa key role in
processing the information gathered concerning, for
example, criminal activities. It could also take a sig-
nificant part in the field of promoting the informa-
tion sharing of border surveillance against both hu-
man and drugs trafficking. Even Albania is involved
in EUFOR, and although their contribution is not a
small thing, reading their own self-description of their
involvement should illustrate that Croatia can abso-
lutely take an increased role without cause for con-
cern on its part or the part ofBiH:
"During those six months, the Albanian Coy
is fully engaged with the security of the Rajlovac
Base where are included main gate, pedestrian en-
trance, the towers ... The most intensive work is at
the gates where they check the ID cards, car passes,
searching the vehicles and pedestrians, as well as
taking care to equip the visitors with the required
documentation according to the Base security propo-
sitions. Theirs is a duty, which doesn't know any
pause but is a closed cycle of 24 hours a day, seven
days a week and so on, and that is one of the main
reasons which put it on top of the list of the most
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It is more than obvious that Croatia belongs to
the EU in every sense. No alliance with the United
States, although it is important to acknowledge that
country like Croatia does not have to pick a side, would
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to the table, and shares with Croatia culturally.
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the interoperability expected in these mechanisms.
Therefore, the mission in BiH presents a rare
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SEE countries, to develop its military establishments .•
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15 The numerical breakdown, from most to least of the Member
states' soldier contributions is as follows: 1.) Germany - 1227,
2.) Italy 1032, 3.) United Kingdom - 669,4.) Spain - 538,5.)
The Netherlands - 447,6.) France - 381,7.) Austria - 265,8.)
Poland, 9.) Greece -182,10.) Portugal-167, 11.) Siovenia-
165, 12.) Finland - 158, 13.) Hungary - 119, 14.) Sweden - 81,
15.) Czech Republic - 61, 16.) Belgium - 48, 17.) Ireland - 45,
18.) Slovakia -4,19.) Latvia - 3,20.) Estonia - 2,21.) Lithuania
- 1 and 22.) Luxembourg - 1. The numerical breakdown, from
most to least, of the non-Member states' soldier contributions is
as follows: 1.) Turkey - 229, 2.) Bulgaria - 192, 3.) Morocco -
133,4.) Canada -112,5.) Romania -110, 6.) Albania - 70,7.)
Chile - 24, 8.) Switzerland - 9, 9.) Norway - 3, 10.) New Zea-
land - 3, and 11.) Argentina - 1. - Data from the Official EUFOR
Web-site: EUFOR Troops Strength - http://www.euforbih.org/
organization/strength.htm
16 Official Journal of the EU: Article 14 of Council Joint Action
2004/570/CFSP on the European Union Military Operation in
Bosnia and Herzegovina - 12th July 2004 - L252/10, 28th July
2004, http://eu ropa .eu. intieu r-lexilex/LexU riSe rvlsite/en/oj/20041
1_252/1_25220040728en0010 0014.pdf
17 Skons, Elisabeth: International Financing of Peace Opera-
tions, Stockholm Peace Research Institute, 22nd March 2005.
18 Entire document at http://europa.eu.intieur-Iex/pri/en/oj/dati
2004/1_063/1_ 06320040228en0068008 2.pdf
19 Common costs for Operation ALTHEA (total 71.7 million €
for the 2004-2005) and the complete list of what constitutes a
common cost can be found in Annexes I, II, III.
20Ibid.p.15.
21 The same should be done in the sense of the EU accession
sharing experience. For example, Croatia benefited from the
experience of the lessons learned from the transitional coun-
tries in the last EU enlargement wave (like Hungary, Czech Re-
public, Slovakia etc.), but had to translate all documents in or-
der to be able to use them. On the other hand, some countries
from the region (incl. BiH) can use Croatian documents without
translation, concerning the language similarities, and this ben-
efit represents the significant alleviation in the mentioned proc-
ess.
22 Albanian Contigent, 1LT Saimir Mustafaj, ALB Army EU FOR
Forum No.6, July 2005, http://www.euforbih.org/forum 1006/p13al
tefp13a.htm
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